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T1LE Si S.

LIABILITY

OF A MASTER TO HIS SERVANT FOR

DAMAGES

SUFFERED THROUGH THE NEGLIGENCE OF ANOTHER SERVANT.

by

FRANK CUMMINGS.
----0---CORNELL UNIVERSITY SCHOOL OF LAW,HJ1889.
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Lawlike other scienceshas settled principles,7upon which
Unlike them, howeverits deduc-

its reasoning is founded.

tions sometimes run counter to conflicting d ctrines which mod.
ify their applicationo.
Public policy.and the necessities of business are the nA1prolific of these modifying principles.
doctrine is settled,except to transactions

A

Th.refore no legal
in a substantially

settled industry: transactions to which those doctrines have
been uniform~;"
Law is the

and7 eozisistently applied.
creature of social and conmmercial necessity:

the servant,not'not the lord,of society-and business.

When

a new industry is developedold legal doctrines are applied.
If they minister to its wellfarethe law suffers no change;
butif they prove unwholesome and restrictivethe law must be
so modified as not

* conflict with the wellfare

of the busi-

ness: for,if the industry be a boon to the public)it
more than the integrity of any legal doctrine.

is valued

If courts do

not make the necessary modificationslegislatures will.
Legal doctrines,therefore,conform to the necessities of
the business whose transactions they are intended to regulate
and remain unsettled as long as that business is undergoing
rapid change.

The doctrine under consideration most
to the operations of private corporations.

frequently applies
Rulings upon liti-

gation arising out of their transactions have gone far to establish existing theories concerning a masters liability to
the servant

for the negligence

of his fellows.

The business of these corporationshowever,is of such recent oligin that the doctrines applied to it are as changeable
as criminal law on the frontier.

Jus

*ce "ill1E,in Liverpool

Insurance Co. v . Massachusetts,says 0 The subject of the powersdutiesorightsand liabilities of corporations,thei!

essen-

tial nature and characterand their relations to the business
transactions of the communityhave unredgone a change in this
country within the last half century the importance of which
can hardly be over estimated.

They have entered so extensive-

ly into the business of our country,the most important business
of which is carried on by them-as banking companiesrailroad
companies,express companiestelegraph companies,insurance companies ete.- and the demand for the use of corporate powersin
combining the capital and energy required to conduct these
large operationsis so imperative thatboth by statute and by
the tendancy of the courts to meet the requirements of these
public necessitiesthe law of corporations has been so modified,liberalized,and enlarged,as to constitute a brashch

of

jurisprudence with a code of its own: due mainly to very re-

cent times.

To attemptthereforeto define a corporation,or

to limit its powers by the rules which prevail when they were
rarely created for any other than municipal,purposes,and gener
ally by royal charteris impossible in this country and at
this time."
A doctrine with reference to the liability

of a conpore-

tion as mastersettled by a decision of forty years standing,
may,therefore,\vith due respect to the distinguished; court prnouncingitbe questioned;for

fully nine tenths of the corpo-

rate business,developed in many new Plases and under various
new conditionshas since arrisen.
The immediate conduct of this business is necessarily intrusted to agents.

Therefore the companis' liability

for the

contractual and to tious acts of itsiagants'is a question of
vital importance to the company,the agents.,and the public.
' liThere seems no difficulty in establishing the master's

bility upon his agents contracts made within the scope of his
authority.

Likewise,when strangers are injured by the negli-

gence of the companiY'

agentsacting for the furtherance of

their masters interest and in the scope of their employment,
the master is liable.
In both of these cases the courts have uniformly held the
companies liable to out- side pabties'holding the agents act to
be the act of the master.

No distinction was at first made

between an injured party who was a stranger and one who was
him self a servant.

The distinction was first drawn in

Priestly v Fowler(3 Meeson and Wellsby): decided in the English court of Exchequer in 1837.
The plaintif was engaged b

the defendant as a butc.er.

The defendant sent annther employee ,who drove the delivery
wagonto accompany and deliver some goods to the plaintiff;and,
by the negligance of the driversaid'-drive- was thrown to the
ground and injured.

Thereupon he brought suit and obtained a

verdict against his employer for damages.
taken which resulted in

An appeal was then

a reversal of judgment.

Lord Abinger~delivering the opinion of the courlsaid"The
mere relation of master and servant never can imply an obligation on the part of the master to take more care of the servant than he may be reasonably expected to do of himself.
He isno doubtbound to provide for the safe-ty of his servant
in the course of his employment to the best of his judgment,
informationand belief.

1
his
The servant is not bound to rik

safety in the service of his master and mayif he sees fi;

uo

decline any service in which he reasonably apprehends injury
to himself;and,in most of the cases in which danger may be incurred,if not in allhe is just as likely to be acquainted
with the probability and the extent of it as the master.

IN

that sort of employment,especiallVy,which is described in the

5
declarati

n in

this

casethe

plaintiff

must have known as well

as the masterand probily better,whether the van was suffi-ie
cient,whethcr it was overloadedand whether it was likely to
carry him safely.

In factto allow this sort of action to

prevail would be an encouragement to tho servant to omit that
diligence and caution which he is in duty bound to exercise on
behalf of his master to protect him against the misconduct of
others who serve him:and which diligance and caution,while
they protect the masterare a much better security against any
injury which the servant may sustain by the negligence of
others engaged under the same master than any recourse against
his master fot damages could possibly afford. "
It is questionable whether this decision is based more
largely on the fact that the plaintiff was a co-servant of the
driver ,or that the plaintiff was himself negligent.

Therefore

the notion that this decision settled the English doctrine to
the effect that a master is not liable to his servant

for in-

juries sustained by him through the negligence of another employee,vworking in common with him for the furtherance of a
common purposeis questionable though is conceded.
The earliest American decision tending to establish the
above
in

rule was rendered by the Supreme

Court

of *cj-t

Carolina

71rry v. The South Carelina Rail Road Company4February

181l)

The plaintiff was employed as firemEan on a locomotive used and

erployed by the defendants on their rail road. The injuries
out

of which this accident arose were received by the plain-

tiff while engeged in the discharge
by reason of the engine

of his dutie~s as

fireman,

on which he was employed being thrown

from the track by the negligence of the engineer who refused
of neglected to lessen the speed or stop the engine afetr his
attention had been called to the obstacle on the track which
occasioned the accident.

The injmred servant brought

suit and

recovered against the rail road company and the defendant :ioved for a new trial.
Judge Evans,delivering the

opinion of the

court,recog-

nized the doctrine of agency as admitted in the leading case
of McManns,: v.Crickettand 2ollowed by all cases on that
ject since--namely v

That the master is liable

sub-

for damages

caused by the act of his servant who is acting in good faith
within the scope of his authority for the
masters interest.

furit.crance of his

;2

To exempt the rail roa,:

company from liabilitythe

court

must harmonize this case with the above doctrine of find some
legal reason for setting it aside.
The courtby the following quotation fro.- the opinion,
admits that if

the

injury had been done

pany would have been liable.
court,3

that,in

general,the

"

There

to a stranger

the com-

is no questior,"

says the

principal is

liable

for* the

acts

of the agentperformed in the execution of his agencyof in
and about the business of his principal.
rail road would be liable to passengers

Thus the owner

of a

for injuries sustained

by the neligence of any of its servantssuperior or subordinate,because it

is implied in the un ertaking to carrynot

only that the road and cars are 5 ..
employed are compete it
if one employ anagent

but

that the

servants

and will perform their duty.

So, als,

to execute any work whereby an injury

may result to a 5tranger the law requires it to be done with
care,and if a stranger sustain an injury his princi-el is liable,as decided in O'Connell v.Strong (Dudley,265).n

"But", the

court aCYs",in this c se the employee is neither a stranger
no- a passenger."
Therefore,there being" no precedent for holding the master
liable to a servant for acts of another servant,the court ;ran,
ted the motion:adding thatsince the servant is not liable tol.
the master for the acts of another servantthe master should,
therefore, be~held-not

liable to the

to-the servant

for the L

acts of another servant.
The

court denied that the engineer was in this case the

represe iautive of the company in doing the wrongful act which
injured the plaintiff.? It also maintained thathad the injured man been a

stranger,!,tlie

engineers act would have been the

act of the company and would have bound it as

such.

What renders one and the same act of the engineer the
company when a

act of the

stranger is

of a mere co-employee when a servant

thereby injured and that
is

injured does not ap-

pear from the reasoning,but it was acted upon as a mere arbitrary rule.
This decision is farther basedupon an interpretation of
the servants contract.

The court

imports into it a stipula-

tion by the servant to stand the ordinary risks
ment.

It

of the employ-

farther -uses this question,"Since the servant con-

tracts to take the ordinary risks of the service,why ntn

the

extraordinary ones as well?
Th[ s

interpretation

of the contract

is

answered in

the

following terms by Justice O'Neall in a dissenting opimion.
K- says" I admit hereince for allthat the plaintifflike any
other

ervant,took,as a consequence of his contractthe usual

and ordinary risks of his employment.
What is

meant

by this?

No more than that he could not

claim for an imjury against which the ordinary prudence of his
employers,their agents,ar himselfcould\provide.
negligence is made out as the

When ever

cause of injuryit does not re-

sult from the ordinary risks of the employment."
Littlejtherefore, seems to come of the seevants implied
contract to assume the ordinary risks of his employment;for
no reason could import the nejligence of reckless and irrespon-

L-I

sible men into the reasonable, ordinary risks of' an orderlywel
conducted business,done in a quasi-l;ublic capacity,exclusively
by hired agents,and upon the safety of which the well fare of'
the traveling and busine-;s public depends.
It was strongly urged by a minority of this bench that tht.
reasoning if the court failed to sustain its position;but,
since this decisionthe conclusion has obtained substantial
recognition by the courts of this country and England*
Stated brieflyit

is

is

as

follo-s.

'zA master or em-loyer

not responsible to his servants for injuries,

uffered by

them in cansequence 9f the negligence,carelessness, or misconduct of his other servants engaged in the same general employment;unless the employer has himself been at fault either
in negligently furnishing unsafe appliances for his employees,
retaining such ap-liances after their unsafe condition is
known to him,employing fellow-servants known to him as unsafe,
or negligently and willfully retaining such servants after +t,
their true character is known to him.'h
Although the case just criticised laid down tLe above
ruleyet it was not placed upon a solid foundation of legal
reasoning till Justice Shaw pronounced the opinion in Farwell
v., The Boston and Wooster Rail RoadCompany (38. Am. Dec. 339,
decided by the Supreme Court of Mass.in March 1842),.
The plaintiff,an engineer in the employ of the defendant,

was

injured through the negligence

He

of a switch tender.

sued and obtained a verdict against the compahy who brought ttcase to the Supreme Court upon appeal.
Chief Justice Shaw,delivering the
said " The rule

(of McManus v.

on the great principle

opinion of the court,

Crickett.1 East,106)

founded

is

the

in

of sooial duty that every man

management o f his own af'airs,whether by himself or by his
agents or servantsshall so conduct them as not to injure another:and;if he does not and another sustains damage thereby,
he

shall answer for it.

If

done by a servant

in course

of

his employmentand acting within the scope of his authority,
it is consideredin contemplation of the law,-o far the act of
the master that the latter shall be answerable civiliter.
The

court thus recognizes that the

the doctrine of agency.

satisfy

The learned judge then proceeds to

place the doctrine relatingf1to
basis of public policy.

decision must

co-servants upon the

sound

He imports into the servants contratt

an implied agreement to watch over the conduct of the servantf
employed with him in a conon task,to restrain

him if he be

negligentto report him to headquarters if he persist in negligence,to leave the employment

if

he prove an unsafe

co-labor

er and is not discharged)or to pay the penalty of taking his
own risks if accident occur.

This holding realy places upon employees the dut' of mutual supervision under the penalty of standing their owi, risks
should they fail to exercise it;and thusby making all responfor the carefullness of eac .,insures a more care full

sible

body of servants and promotes the safety and welfare of people
and property committed to their care,
This is analogous to the F4ank Pledge of William the
Conqueror whereby he made a community pay the penalty of a
crime connitted by, one of its

members- and thus made it

keeper of its own peace and order whether

the

it would or no.

The following further quotati:,n justifys this position.
"But this tdoctrine of McManus V. Crickett)

does not apply to

the case of a servant bringing his action alairst his own employer t

recover damages for an injury arising

inthe

crirse

of that employment,where all such risks and perils as the ermployer and servant respectively intend to assume and bearmay
be regulated by express or implied contract between them and
which,in contempletion of law,must be presumed to be thus rega
lated.
This further quotation also tends to place the doctrine
upom public policy.,'
"In considering the rights and obligations arising out
of particular relations,it isocompetent for courts to regard
considerations of policy and general convenience and draw from

them such rules as willin their practical application,best
This is the basis upon

promote Yhe safety of all concerned.
which implied promises are raised,"

"Theylpassenger carriers) are heli to strict responsibility for care,vigilanceand skill,on the part of themselves an"t
all persons employed by them;and they are paid accordingly.
The rule is founded upon the expediency of throwing the risk2
upon those who can best guard against it."
"Vhen several persons are employed in the conduct of one
common enterprise or undertakingand the safety of each depends much on the care and skill with which each other shall
perform his appropriate duty,each is

observer of the conduct

of the otherscan give notice of an

misconductincapacity,or

neglect of dutyand leave the service if the common employees
will not take such precautions and employ such agents as the
safety of the whole party may require.

By these means the saf-

ty of each will be much more effectually secured than could be
done by resort to the common employer for indemnity in case of
loss by negligence by each other."
As the servants in this case were so ;laced as to have an
opertunity to exercise a supervising eye and restraining care
over each otherthis case settled the doctrine beyond a doubt.
The learned justice went farther however andrelying on the
theory of a fiction od ] w in the contract,laid down a rule

so sweeping and comprehensive as to work inj
cases where
the

stice in many

it has been loosly followed andLo contradict even

consideration

of policy upon .vhich the rule

holdssubstantially,that

is

btsed., He ]-

all who are not em-,loyers are co-

workers and that the master is exempt from responsibility for
an injury to any servant by the negligence

of another servant:

that a servant is a servant,and youi.cant make any thing else
out

of him l although,in rare

instancesnegligence may be traced

through him to the master.
This decision thus recognizes two independent grounds./onej
of public policy and the other~one of irn lied agreement imported by the court into the contract of service.
Some courts

claim that this

is

a mere matter of interpre-

tation ofO the contract itself:the courts conviction of the
fair intendment of the contracting parties.

The majority,howJ

everhold it to be a fiction of lawan implied contract running collateral tb the original agreement.
The application of the doctrine that a servan t engages
with reference to both the ordinary and extraordinary --isks
of the employmentincluding

even the negligence

of irresponsi-

ble agents.orks a hardship in many instances which Justice
Shaw contemllated when he placed the following caution at tha
close

of his opinion.
in

cc'ing to the conclusion that the plaintiff

in

the

present case is not entitled to recoverconsidering it as in
some measure a nice questionwe wo,'ld caution against any
hasty conclusion as to the
not

application of this

fully within the same principle.

varied by circumstances not appearing
VIODIF1CATIONS

rule

to a cse

It

may be modified and

in

th]e

present

case."

OF THE GEI'NER-L RULE.

The frequent necessityfor the modification of this rule
as applied to particular casesand the toning down of its
harshmess by liberal interpretatinnq,hav
ing --roblems

lo the courts.

given most perplex-

The increasing increment of cases

apising for its application as corporate business multiplies
and expands,and the numerous instances which have developed in
which the strict

rule would work

oppressionhave

frequent modification and, sometimes ,even
the

courts

its

demanded its

reformation by

and,in some instances its partial abrogation by

st atute.
The frequent difference of judicial opimion concerning who
are

fellow servants within this rtle,whether there

"w;ithout as well as w"ithin

itwhether.-the

master

is

are servant
liable

to

his servant when he has entirely wit idrawn his discretion and
bestowed it upon a superior employee whose will is thus made
to take the place of the masters will all these have furnished
occasion for a labyrinth of decisions to suit the justice and
circumstances

of particular

cases through which it

is

quite

impossible

or any legal light to penetrate so as to develoP

from the chaotic mass a settled,harmonious,and consistent ienoral doctrine.
One distinct line of cases places the liability of the
master solely u, om his exercise-or neglect- oi' reasonable ca:' ;
ardif he has si ovm this -o the best of his knowlodoe and abilty,in selkcting safe ap->liances and ordinarily skillfulsober,
and safe co-sermants,the courts exempt him from liability for
any--damage suffered b) a servant in consequence of the negli.ence of another employee (independently of any ot!cer consider
ation);unless it appear that the servant .ras a notoriously unsafe co-'orkman;and that that fact was for sometime known to
the de.fendant) or was so bald that he was 7 ilty of gross negligence in not discovering it and pnioviding against the danger.
Here, again, a net work of cases, presenting a plexus of
holdings to suit various facts and circunstnces,bars the w.,ay.
"Ihat constitutes a dangerous servant ,'_ose habits the master
should know?to what Sgents ncay such facts be known an-- thereby:
charge the master with knowledge? What amount
master use

of care must the

in selecting the servant? May he delegate that duty

to another servant and be held for that servants neglect? How
far may the injured servant havetCtrusted the masters o%'oversees discretion and not pay the penalty of such confidence bly
losing his legal remedy? These and manyother as per-Ilexing

questions trip

and tanible

the courts.

Another line of' c7.ses holds that
the true doctrine

is

based on the purpose of the

courts to compel' servants to

watch over and restrain the

careless conduct of oneanother,to

report such misconduct to headquarters,to avoid a persistnitly
in order that servants mray be made supervisors of each others
and thereby a higher,s ,fer,more sober and careful

conduct

of servants may be secured to the
personal

of a penalty

is

that the

property and

whose

within their

safety so largely falls

Their theory

public

rule was framed

line

hands.'
in

the nature

for the public good;and that employees have ample

oppertunity to protect the publicif compelled to do so,and,
at the

same timeto guard their own safety.

They object stren-

uously to the doctrine that ah employee contracts to run all
the risks of the employment arising from both the negligence
of irresponsible servants and from accident. They urge that to
enforce

this

rule in

cases where

thlirajured party had no opper-

tunity to observe the conduct of the negligent party,to cxercise a restraining influence

over him, or to forsee and avoid

danger,would convert a rule ,intended

for the general

:ielfare,

into an engine of oppression:an arbitrary conclusion drawn
from precedent without investigating its fundamental reasons
and a contradiction of the
it was founded,

considerations of policy upon which

17

thev.oourts mip4t

iness principlesand
consistent

to ieason and sound bus-

itself

This view seems to coiivend

basis which 'vould preserve

on this

line of holdips

co: e to a unifoni and

the stability of the general rule and give litigants a fair
assu .

ance under all jurisdictions.
Thishappily~is

:Ily t
not

the tendancy

of courts at present:especidl

ose untrameled courts of new states whose actions are

circ mscribed by bare " red and riveted precedent :courts

7:hich base their decision upon reason rather than holding.
The United States Courts
lishedby the opinions
Ill.,

Ky.,

Tenn.,

Ga.,

'ustain this position and it is estah-

of eminent judges
Cal.,and the

in

Mich 1 ,Penn.,1nd.,

incoming state of Washing-

ton:a> approach is established in Ohio;and Iowa, Kansasand
some

other states

have

settled

it

by statute.

When a servant,not himself at fault,is injured by the
negligence of ine in the same business acting in good faith fMthe interests of his masterthis construction of the rule
holds the master:providing the negligent servant

is in a dis-

tinct branch of the business and there is to oppertunity of
mutual oversight,and no means are afforded one to avoid the
dangers arising from the negligence of the other.
A fai

conclusion from this confirms the

are employees,not

theory that thev&

fellow servants within the rule. but diffi-

culties beset and complications buffet us at every tarn. The
ingenuity of courts has been strained to determine what

18
constitutes distinct branches of a business.

No test has been

found which may be employed to meet tie circumstances

of all

cases.
IvIMO ARE C(Slin
a workman in

IPLOYEES \ITHI14 TIIE RULl".

of cases holds that a master mechanic,a

surveyor,

a repair sJ.opand a brid, "e carpenter are not co-

employees in the same sense vith the servants running the rail
road companies trains

another,that a train hand on a freight

is not a co-employee with one in a simil r position on an exp ess;onethat a track foreman is not a co-servant with the
shovelers;and another,that the conductor is n~t a co-employee
with the train boy whom he ordered to d& duty as a brakeman.
Another line of cases hold Yhe above as co-servants with
in the rule and refuses to suspend its operation unless the ep
employees derive their contracts

from two masters and their

pay from distinct sources.
Foster v.

Minn.etc. R.R.Co.(i4 Minn.360? lays down the

following generally accepted rule."Servants in the employient
of the same master,under the same general controland engaged
in

promoting the same common object are co-employees.
Here the courts again split and travel towards various

points of the compass in determining what servants are engaged
in

promoting one conmxon object.

one holds that they must labvl/

19
declares car-roofers

togatherland
train-ii, n,
of the
takes

to be without the

rule,

d by the ne ,,ligence of

injr.

same master, as such,to be wit!,-in the rale.
position and applies

an intermediate

testing

bx

the character

servants

all

Another holds

Anoti:er,
one

other testa:

of the servant's act

and another by

his relativo rank.
The Ohio cases
in

the employment

controland

make the Mass. rule read thus." Servants

of the

engaged in

NTO CONTROL IS

same master,under

promoting the

IVEN TO 07E

This raakes servantsin

-ame

OVER THE OTHER,

different branches

employeesbut overseers and foremengy
workmen under their control.

the same

connon object, VJHE Ri
are

fellow.z

Stevens

servantS,

of the business

co-

not co-servants with

This was held in WHalan V.MAd

River etc. R.R.Co.( 8 Ohio 249),as the result of
R.R.Co. Y,'v.

general

Little Miami

(20 OHIO 415. ),and Cleveland etc. R.R.do.

v. Keary.(6 Ohio 201);and is settled law in Ohio.
Another line, led by the Farwell case

in

Mass.

and Murry

v. South Carolina bo. in S.C., holdsthat the same consideratiun
of public policy which exempt the master in one case extent to
all

cases without regard to, the relative

They also~hold that all employees

grades

of employment.

contract to stand the risks

incident to the employment,and that the negligence of all
employees in the

sane business is one

of those risks

?

The statement

of these

casesand the analysis

of their

holding have been sufficiently entered upon in the early part
of this paper.

The New York Courts, with the exception of two

important modifications engrafted on to the general rule,have
Never

substantially followed their holdings.
claim to have

he less,they

discarded the reasoning in precedent cases and

to have settled the rule om strict cofpmon law principles.
The consi eration of the second line of cases to which
this

paper referes naturally

follows the examination of

THE NEW YORK DOCTRINE.
This doctrine is settled by three distinctcollateral
lines of holdings apparently not tresspassing upom one anotheE
grounds. One line settles the doctrine concerning employes in
distinct branches of the masters servise;one,,as to the masters
liability for lack of reasonable care in not performing certain duties which the courts hold him bound to perform toward
the

injured servant;and one,settling the rule for determining

whem a servant is a vice principal and binds his principal by
his negligent act.
The first line of cases begins with

Coonxv. The Syracuse

and Utica R.R.Co. In the first of Selden.
This action was brought by a track walker who was

injured

while on duty by a state train passing at an unusual hour and
negligently running at night with out lights. This b'ou&Lt the
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question squarely before

the court.,,;and,although

the plaintiff

was in a distinct branch of the service,they held him a co-employee of the train men.
Two judges

vrote

opinions which were no more than cita-

tion and approval of the Farwell,Murry and Priestly cases.
This question came up sudcessivelyon facts involving the
founded upom substan ,

same principle,and with similar results
_t(ally the same

citationsin Sherman v. The R chester and Syra-

cuse R.R.Co.(17

'.Y. ),in

holt v.

in Ross v. Central R.R.Co.
Co.

( 5Hun

The

Central R.R.Co.(18

NT.y.),

),and in Vick v. Central R.R

( 95 N.Y.),
The last case was based mainly on the Ross casebut also

relied upon the entire line of decisions.

Therefore the Murry

and Farwell cases contain the sum total of the New York doctrine upom this important question.
The

facts of the Vick case were these.---- George Vick

resided in Rochester,and was employed as
shppo

of the

rail

road company at Buffalo.

foreman of the tinHe was paid bybthe

hour for his time while in the shops;andas a part of the
contract of employment,was daily carried free of charge on the
defendants
at Buffalo.

trainsbetween his home
Negligent trlin

-in

Rochester tnd the shops

men run another train

one on which Vick was riding and injured him.

into the

He brought

suit

22
and recovered against the company for his injuries.
The

court of Appeals',reversing the trial court and Gener-

al Termheld that th2 plaintiff could not recover, on the

grout

that he was in the ccmpany's service while thus traveling on
its trains.

This being established,the mere citations of the

other cases settled the question.
Nothing could be more distinct than the employment of
the conductor who caused the

Vick and that'of
treasury

from which they drew their

injury.

pay was the

A aingle

only thing

common to the stationg.
This firmly establishes the doctrine,in New York that all
servantsperforming

their duties toward the masterare co-em-

ployees without the slighest regard to the relation
duties.

of their

Even an attorney of a rail road,traveling free of

charge on its train to reach his field of duty for the

company4

could not recover for injuries sustained from the negligence .
of a section bosq;for he

is a co-employee laboring with him

for a common purpoee.
The second line o' New York cases begins with
Central R.R.Co.

Wright v.

(25 N.Y.).

One Uptonwhose
engineers for the

business was to employ and discharge

companyordered ah engineer who was skillful

but new to the road,to take a sick engineers place and run an
express train from Suspension Bridge to Rochester in the night,

Adams,the enginoer,protested that he was incompetent to take
the

train over the road in the night till he became better

acquanted with it.

Never the lesshe proceeded to carry out

the order;and~a collisi n occured through his inability to determine whether a certain train,which he was to meet at one
of the stationswas

side-tracked,statding,or in motion.

The

collision injured a brakeman who brought suit aainst the company for damages.
The

Court of Appeals held that the accident was not the

result of any lac#

of skill in the engineer which was known to

the companyand laid
1. tThe master

down th1
is

liable

following principles.
to the servant

for- injury occur-

ing through his own misconduct and negligenceand this may
consist

in the employment of unfit or incompetent co-agents

and co-servants or in providing impliments,machineryor facilities

for the use tof the servant

improper or unsafe

in

tne

accomplislxnentwhich

for the purpose~i-& of their

ae-

application."

2. 3 The master does not undertake with his servant for the
skill or competency of his emploqees;nor for the continued
sufficiency or safety of the materiels

or impliments furnished

for the work,or for the convenience of the. laborers but is only
bound to exercise reasonable care in the

selection and employ-

ment of the co-servants,and in the original selection of the
material apliances;and,in the case of material or impliments
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badoming defective or insufficient,from subsequent causeshe i
is only ans erable for injuries arising therefrom in

those

instances in which he personally knew,or ought to have known
of the defect or insufficiency."
The question again arose in Lanning v. The Certral R.R.CQ
(49 N.Y. ).this made the important addition of the pollowing
principle."

If

the master delegates to te-

agent the duty of

employing workmen,of of originally selesting physical appliances for the conduct of the businessthe master is responsible
to any servant wh- suffers injury from the legligence of that
agenjt in

the performimgon of that duty."

It appears that the

laintif" Lanning was employed as

carpenter for the Central Rail Road C~jmpany.

His work requir-

ed the building Of-,a staging and the defendants foreman, while
intoxicated~ordered the staging to be built in a-n unskillful
manner and left in an unsafe condition*
the plaintiff

It

fell and injured

who blought suit and recovered against the co,-

pany.
The Court of Appeals affirmed the judgment

and laid down

the principle as above stated.
The principle of the last two cases was followed in
Flike etc. v. Boston & Albany R.R.Co.(53 N.Y. )and remain un
change d.
The line of de:rarkation between

the second and third
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lines of New York decisions is less emphatic than between the
first and secondbut it is none the less distinct. The third
line of decisions

swings away from the long line of precedents

binding the other 'and formulates a clear cut rule by which to
determine,in anycase,whether a servant

is a co-employee or a

vice-principal.
Two cases ( Crispen v. babbitt,81 N.Y.);
N.Y. Cent. and H.R.R.R.Co., 91 N.Y.

and

Shehen v.

)contain the entire theory

upon which this formula is based.
In the former case one John Rabbitt,the nephew of B.T.
Babbitt and financial manager of the latters foundry in
WhitesboroughN.Y.,odrered

a workman

an engine beyond the dead point.

to turnthe

fly wheel of

While the servant was turn-

ing the wheel Babbitt let the steam onto tl.

engine. The fly-

wheel caught and severely injured the workman who brought suit
and recoveragainst the master B.T.Babbitt.
The Court of Appealsafter a strong contestevidenced by
a powerful dessenting opinion delivered by Judge Earl and concurred in by Judges Finch and Danforthheld the master not
liable, all conceded that John Babbitt was,,the vice-principal;
and that hisacts,AS SUCH, bound the master;but the majority of
the

court held him not a vice-principal in the performance of

the acts of a mere employee.

Hencethe

formular--4The duties

NOT THE STATION,of an employee determine whether he is the

If the master,even,performs duties

alter ego of the master.
belonging to the

servant,he thereby becomes a mere

co-employee

from liability for his own negli-

for the time and is exempte

gence resulting in damages to his servant althoug. he would be
liable should he

order another servant to perform the same

act in a similar manner in his presence.
Shehen v. N.Y.C.& H.R.R.R.Co. reinforces this rule by the
converse of the same proposition.
The plaintiffs intestate was a fireman on a west bound
Wild-cat train on the Auburn branch of defendants rail road.
A regular train was running east toward Cayuga as the west
bound train approached Auburn. A general rule of the

company
y

required wild-cat trains to progress from station to station
special orders from the train dispatcher. An order was sent to
the wild-cattrain at Auburn to proceed to Cayuga and there
This order was properly delivered

meet the east bound train.

and the train proceeded toward Cayuga. At the same time the
dispatcher sent an order to the operator at Cayuga directing
him to hold the east bound train for further orders.
The duty of the operator was to execute this order by
delivering it to the conductor and engineer'which hethrough
to do.

forgetfullnessfailed

In

a moment

the train

was beyond

his reach and a collision Aesulted which caused the death of
the plaintiffs

intestate.

An action was brought

against the

o--

of the

company for the killingThe court

fireman.

of Appeals held the company liable

on the

fol-

lowing grounds.
liThe

corn any were under a duty of furnishing to their

emnloyuees a code of rules sufficient for their safety in the
thJis case,done.

running of trains--which,wasin
2.
ish its

The

company was under just as positive a duty to furn-

employees with suffici

nt and timely notice of any

deviation from the re -ular rules whereby they were thrown into
danger--whichwas,in
3.

this

case,not done.

In car'rying out this special order to deviate from

the time table,the

operator at Cayuga would have

c~one

NOT THE

S. RVANTS DUTY TOWARD THE MASTER BUT THE MASTERS DUTY TOWARD
THE SERVANT ,ANDAS

HE FAILED TO CARRY IT

OUT,H1S MIASTER THERE4

BY FAILED TODO AN IMPERATIVE DUTY WHICH HE ATTEMPTEDTHROUGH
HI1M,T(

PER-OEM.

THE OPERATOR WAS THE ALTER ErJO IN THIS CASEOF THE MASTER.
This corallary rollows

from the holding---if the master

authorizes a servant of any grade to perform any duty which he
owes to his employees,that servant stands in the masters place"
andf,if his negligent
servanT,his master

is

performance
liable.

or that duty injures another

TIUS A \rATER BOY MAY BECO, E A

VICE-PRINCIPAL OF THZ MOST POV\ERFUL RAIL ROAD OAJIPAiNY.

The holdings cited in this paper have established the
duties of the master toward his servants to be substantially.
1. To furnishto the best of his knowledge and ability,
proper servantssafe machinery and appliancesand an ample
code of regulations for the safe conduct of his business.
2. To use reasonable care in keeping the machinery and
appliances in a safe condition and in seeing to itto the best
of his knowledge

and abilitythat the

co-servants remain sobeV

skillful,and safe.
3. To notify the employees when they are put in danger b,;
unsafe appliancesmachenery,or premises.
4. To warn thesservants of any change in the regulations
whereby they are thrown into danger.
5. To furnish a servant a safe place to work.
Damages to one employee through the negli .ence of another
which do not,in some particular,involve

the necessary breach

of some one or more of the above dutiesof the master,arepretty generally in New York,held to have been the result of risks
incident to the employment which the servant
contracted to

is

held to have

stand.

The New York courts claim to have rejected all -recedent
and to have decided this doctrine on commonlaw principles.
Stated in a nut-shell~it is this.
You sue a master --- for what---negligence. The courts say

"Very well,prove
ing to prove

have put

Nowifin

try-

your case,you fail to establish a breach of any

of the masters duties,he
say"The

h old him."

your 'case and we'll

is not ne?-ligent;and the court will

one you have sued for negligence is not negligent;you
your finger on another man:you hav'nt proved thor caeL-

stuited in your complaint,and you must fail in your action.
But if you establish a breach of one of those duties;
either by the master or by any one whom he has directed to pep
form it;and that you were injured thereby;you have established
HIS NEGLIGENCE and you can recover.
Again,if you only establish the negligence of the master
or vice-principal IN PERFORMING THE SERVANTS DUTIES TO THE
MASTER,and that

you were thereby injured,you have

failed to

show the masters negligence~for no breach of his duties has
occured: Your action musts therefore, fail.
But it is possible to hang logical weights on this mastep
ly reasonin .Some-..ay!-say)'TNhy

is

the negligence

in a distinct branch of the service

one of the risks incident

to the srvants employment?The answer is
makes it, so."

of an employe

" Because the law

Then why does the law make it so?

"Becausefrom

the nature of the case,it is one of the risks.
Again,--If the negligence

of a servant is one of the risk

necessarily incident to the employment,why is not the negli-

gence of the master an

incident risk: upon what do you base

any logical distinction?the answer is the same."Because the
law makes the masters neg'ligence not one of the risks." Then
why does the law make

it so?

"Because it is not one of the

risks."
Again,--Why are the masters duties toward the servant
those which the courts have enumerated? "Because the courts
have declared them to be the duties." Why did the courts so
declare them?
the master

Because they are the masters duties." Why is'nt

compelled ro warrent the

appliances,an

employees? "Because the law does not make tha

one of his duties."
duties?

safety of his machinery,

"Because

it

Why does not the law make itone of his
is

not one

of them."

These are only arbitrary rules:

Theyiare not

conclusions

from principles or deductions from legal premises. They are
assumptions upon which legal reasoning had been based. Thereforeif any tribunal refuses to accept themall the reasoning
based upon them fails.
Courts of last resort in several states refuse to accept
them.

They differ concerning the risks incident to the employ-

ment and the duties which the master owes his servant.
hold the negligence o

They n,

a co-servant in a distinct branch of

the business not an incident risk which the employee assumes
by his contract;and that the master has not performed all

of
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his duties toward his servants by placing a seemingly fitbut
really recklessforeman over them or a seemingly fitbut realy
dissapated and un-afe,servant among them.
Three out of seven judges o2 the New York court are in
sympathy with this more liberal view.

To confirm this belief,

note the dissenting opinion of Judge Earl in Crispen V. Babbit
Concerning the proposition that the middle man is a vice-princi>al when doing masters work and a co-servant when doing
servants work he says."The middle man thus occupies a dual position:that of co-servant as to all matters within the scope
of his employment and the discharge of such matters as are not
personal toor absolute upon the master,and as a vice-princinal as to all matters where he abuses his authotity,or is
charged with the discharge of duties which the master himself
should have discharged,or which rest upon the master as absolute duties.
I have made a thorough examination of the cases reported
in this country and in England,and I think I may safely affifrm
that there is no case in which the question was raised where
this dual relation has been recognized and the rule thus laid
down."
Speaking of the grounds of the Mass. holding he says"As A
the masters responsibility has been extended by the doctrine
of respondeat superarior from considerations of PUBLIC POLICY,
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so that doctrine has been limited by similar consideration2, in
respect to tj e ma1ter_

rpQnsibility to his servants.

THE

LIMITATION HAS NO FOUNDATION IN ABSTRACT OR NATURAL JUSTIC.,
AND ALL ATTEMPTS TO PLACE IT ON ANY OTHER iOUNDALION THAN THAT
OF PUBLIC POLICY WILL PROVE UNSAT1SFACYORY WHEN BROUGHT TO THE
TEST OF CAREFULL AND LOGICAL ANALYSIS."
Refering to the better protection of servants when made
to relY upon their own vigilence

rather than that of a master,

he says"To enforce the supposed public policy a fiction has
been invented by which the

servant is said to assume all the

risks of the service which include the negligence of co-servants

in the same common employment.

If this fiction were

literally applied,if it were held that every servant entering
into the service of a master assumed all the risks incident to
such service,the master would not be responsible to the servant

for his own negligence,as that would be

dent to the serv-ce

as much an inci-

asthe negligence of a co-servant.

Refering to a superintendent he says"it

is not too much z-

for a master to be responsible for his negligence.

He is gen-

erally a person selected with care,of superior judgmemt and
skill,and is,more

generally than other servants,able to re.--'

spond to his master for his own negligence.

ican perceive no

reason founded on public policy,as there is none founded any
principle of natural justicefor

limiting the doctrine of
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superior

respondeat

in its application to the relations betwen
The master shotld be responsib&

the master and sudh an agent.
fo

all his negligence while engaged in the service;because he

stands in his place representing him as his alter es9;and I
can percieve no reason founded upon public policy and expediency for enforcing that doctrine in such a case in favor of
strangers,which does not exist for enforcing it
the

oVher servants of the
This

conmion master.

shows the minority of this court to be in sympathy

with an approach to the
(1880)

in favor of

Ailine

rule laid

of holdings,settled in seven states establishes

an approach to this rule.
and a citation
lows in this

down by the English statute.

of others
important

The examtnation of a tipical
is

all

case

the work that limited sp.ce al-

field.

In Gillenwater v. Mlad&3on & Co, R.R.Co.(5 Ind. 339) The
plaintiff Gillenwater was employed as a bridge carpenter by thE
defendant,but was directed to proceed on the

defendants cars

to a station a short distance from the bridge to assist in
loading timbers.

The cars were thrown from the track by the

negligence of the train mun and Gillenwater was injured.
Refering to the

Farwell

case 'the courts

say,"Between the

switch tender and the engineer of the company the
was close and immediate.
both was the same. Their

connection.

The object to be accomplished by
_uties necessarily connected them-

selves togather as parts of a whole. The passing of the cars
in a given direction was the

instant result flowingufrom their

joint action.
Not so with the plaintiff
carpenteras

in

this

case.

His business as

applied to the erection of a rail road bribgedid

not even remotly link him with the careless management of that
particula~r train---Toughi

in

some a servant

of the

companyhe

was not a co-servant of the engineer and conductor,within the
meaning of the Farewell case. He clearly belonged to a distinct

department
If

the

of duty.

bridge-builder

of the company be regarded as, a

co-

servant of the engineer within the meaning of the Priestly add
Farwell cases,the principlb becomes alike vicious and abserd,
by the very extent of its application. Every person in the
srrvice

of the company is brought within its range.

Even the

position of the legal adviser oi the rail road is included. He
to,is in some measure the company's servant. He derives his
compensation and authority from the same source as the engineerconductor,and bridge-builder.
ter

degree,he

pany.

contributes

Like themthough in a fain-

to the ultimate

Had he been on the train by tle

injured by the same negligence,in.a

objects of the

com-

side of Gillenwater,and

suit against the

company

he too would have been dismissed by the same argument.

He

would have been told that the action was one of new impression,

that he contracted with reference to the risks of employment,
and reserved a compensation in fees with an eye to these risks,
He wvouldtherefore,be denied redress because he was a quasicoservant of the careless engineer.
ima-ine upon what principleseither

It would be
of justice

difficult to

or public

ol-

icy,such ruling could be supported. For the basis of implied
contract

and increased

cornpensation,with

reference

to such

risks,on the part of the conductor and legal advisor,i2 wholly
visionary.
But when it is held that the legal advisor,the carpenter,
and all such quasi-servants of the company are

not co-servant

within the meaning of the Farwell case,because their several
duties belong to different departments;a result is attained,
clear,justsand

of easy application.

Had Gillenwater

recieved the

injury from the nerligence

of a fellow carpenter in the same employment,while erecting
the bridgeor loading the timbersa question would then have
been presented within the

range

of the Farwell case."

This doctrine was maintained in Penn. by 0 Donnell v.
Allegany etc. R.R.Co.
case,the Ill.

court

(59 Penn. St.):also a bribge carpenter

sustained it

in Chicago etc. R.R.Co. v. Mo

randa ( 93 111.), Tenn. courts carry the doctrine to the extreme o

the

Ill.

courts

in

East Tenn.

Kentugky courts make the master liable

R.R.Co.

v.

DeArmond,

for gross negligence

of
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a co-serv:nt-Louisville R.R.Co.

),and this is

followed in 17 Wall.

Judge Cooly reasons that
stranger

Collins

(2 Duval 114),Judge

in Chicago & .I.W.R.H.CO. v. Bayfield (37

Cooly sustaines it

Mich.

v.

.,ovpr~aerfs act

556.

sincebetween a master and a

is the act of the masterupon what

legal grounds is it not the act o." the principal as between
the master and another servant.
STATEIMENT OF THE DIFFERENT RULES.
From the wilderness of precedents,legal principlesand
statuteswe have evolved five distinct doctrines which,for
convenience ,may be designated as fellows.
1. The Massachusetts rule,--exempting the master from the
consequent damages to one servant

from the negliE;ence of anotilb

in the same business:witLt regard to their relative rank or
the distinct character of their duties.
2. The

Ohio rule,-- so modifying the above rule as to

make the master liable for damages to a servant arising from
the negligence of one whom the master has placed in authority,
over him.
3. The New York rule,--making the character of the act
govern entirely.

It holds one doing masters duties toward the

servant to ,be a vice-principal and one doing servants duties
toward the master to be a co-employee.

This makes a servantes

character oscilating.oe may be alternately the one or the
other as he passes

from duty to duty.

4. The public policy doctrine.
This holds that the servants contract to stand the risks
of the employment is a fiction of law imported into the agreement as an implied contract:that this is founded in publie
poli cy:that,by compelling servants laboring togather to guard
one anothers conduct at their perilsafer servants will be
furnishedwhere peoples lives and pro1 erty are committed to
their

care:that the reason upom vrhich this

implied contract

is

based fails where the grades of service are entirely distinct;
that,where

this

reasin fails,the

courts are not justified

in

assuming such a contract to have been intended.
5.

The

statutory

Statutes

doctrine.

in England and several of the United States

reach a result justified by *

the fourth doctrine.

The third,fourth,and fifth rules arose from the desire
of legislatures and courts to braw away from the hardships of
a rule which has grown oppressive in many instances as business has extended its application.
CONFLICT.' OF DOCTRINES.
These theoriescould they be so construed as to stand togather and reach similar results.
B
tIsre
ct But the courtme
contenetd discord and desire uniformity even if it

in a dimust come

through the medium of healingf statutes.
Judge Thompson in his work on negli
one of these principlesconcludes

encein

illustrating

that a master mechanic

of a

rail road is not a co-emlpoyee with the fireman (Vol.2 Page
1032);andin illus rating another one (vol.2 Page lO35),is
forced to conclude that a master mechanic of a rail road is a
co-employee with the locomotive engineer.
A flagman;who negligently allows a train to pass him and
be wrecked on a bridge

in process of repair; binds his master

in New Yorkfor injuries thereby resulting to the trainmen;but
the injured party is remediless in Massachusetts.
A train boy in the employ of the D.L.& W.R.R. is
at Binghanton by the ne:;liEence
master is

of the

conductor.

injured

Since the

a resident of Pennsylvaniahe may bring ah action

and recover against the master in the United States Court.
(17 'all.553)

or bring it

on the same cause

in

the

state

courts

and be non-suitd

of action.
CONCLUSION.

To comprehend all phases of this subjest

in a limited

paper is impossible. Solid food has already be .n consumed to
a surfeit;but the

supply seems to multiply with the consump-

tion,aid to exhaust it would require an indefinitely elastic d
devouring capacity. A critical discussion of holdings on all
the

finer shades of distinction would require a volume instead

of this limited paper.
But the time has not yet arrived for a treatise on the
subject in hand.

The growing necessities of undeveloped

branchies of industry will continue to drive courts and legislat'ures togather on the important features of these yet undeveloped doctrine6 Time and business will solve these as they
have solved all other questions,when legal reasoningfrom different but equally legitimate yrounds~has failed to produce a
harmonious result.

The crucible of tne coming half-century

will bring forth a purity and solidity of doctrine which no
legal dedugtions can now evolve. Then some master at the bar
will write the prorAsed treatise.
productions

A place awaits it

of PomeroyStoryand Pollock;and it

among the towering monuments

beside the

will stand

in the literature of modern Ameri

can law.
Frank Cummings.

